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An individual’s personal goal is one of the strongest motivators, yet its determinants and processes are not well understood,
especially those dealing with person–situation interaction. This
research examines the interactive effects of monetary incentive
types, self-set goal level instructions, and self-esteem on personal goals and goal attainment. A laboratory research study
with a sample of 300 students found a statistically significant
three-way interaction among monetary incentive types (pay for
performance [piece rate], pay for goal attainment [GA-bonus],
and pay for participation [hourly flat rate]), self-set goal level
instructions (an instruction to set hard, easy, any, and no goals),
and self-esteem in influencing personal goals and goal attainment. The highest level of personal goals (and the lowest level
of goal attainment) was achieved by high-self-esteem participants
who were paid for performance and instructed to set hard goals.
This research shows that person–situation interaction is the most
promising in understanding personal goals and their determinants. Organization Management Journal, 9: 148–169, 2012. doi:
10.1080/15416518.2012.708850
Keywords person–situation interaction; self-esteem;
incentives; personal goals; goal commitment

monetary

Locke’s goal theory (see Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002)
has focused extensively on assigned goals and performance,
rather than on the determinants of self-set goals. While in the
last decade much research has been done on self-set goals,
considerably more research is needed, given the central role
that personal goals play in motivation, goal setting, and life
in general. Such a central role is emphasized by “popular theories of self-regulation [that] focus on personal goals . . . as
the most direct determinant of behavior” (Wright & Kacmar,
1995, p. 265). Locke and Latham point out that whether the
goal is assigned or participatively set, an individual may have
a goal in mind that is different. They further argue that “even
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under assigned goals, there is an individual choice process
involved. . . . Thus it is important to discover the factors that
determine what goals the individual will choose when allowed
free choice” (1990, p. 109).
Level of aspiration and contemporary goal-setting research
show that monetary incentives, self-esteem, and high expectations placed on the individual by significant others (such as
instructing the individual to set hard goals), among other factors, influence an individual’s goals. However, the interactive
effect among these variables on personal goals and goal attainment has never been examined before. Erez (2005) calls for
research that examines the effects of person–situation interaction on goal choice and goal attainment.
Studying the interactive effect of self-esteem, monetary
incentive types, and self-set goal level instructions on personal goals and goal attainment is promising for theoretical
and practical reasons. Theoretically, behavior, in general, and
personal goals, in particular, are a function of a complex interaction between the individual and his/her environment (Bandura,
1986; Latham & Pinder, 2005; Lewin, 1935: Lewin et al., 1944;
Vroom, 1964; Weiss & Adler, 1984). In addition, “traits do
not work in isolation from other factors” (Baum, Locke, &
Smith, 2001, p. 292). In this regard, researchers (e.g., Brockner,
1988) have emphasized the importance of integrating selfesteem with other theoretically relevant situational variables to
better understand its effects. Moreover, although much research
has been done on self-esteem, the relationship between selfesteem and monetary incentives is one of the least understood
and is rarely examined. Accordingly, the interaction among
self-esteem, incentive types, and goal instructions may clarify
the confusion surrounding self-esteem’s responsiveness to the
effects of monetary incentives.
Such confusion arises from the fact that some researchers
(e.g., Terborg, Richardson, & Pritchard, 1980) argue that highself-esteem individuals (HSEs) will perform well under contingent and noncontingent rewards due to their personality
disposition to behave effectively (i.e., monetary incentives may
have no or little effect on HSEs), whereas other researchers
(e.g., Korman, 1970; Lawler, 1970) argue that HSEs should
be responsive to the effects of contingent rewards to the
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extent that such rewards result in more favorable self-evaluation
and desirable results for high performance. Terborg et al.
(1980), however, found no empirical support for their argument. Accordingly, additional research is needed, especially
since the preceding arguments by Korman and Lawler suggest
that self-esteem responsiveness to the effects of monetary incentives may depend on the effectiveness of the monetary incentive
system.
The review of the literature shows that the effectiveness
of the monetary incentive system depends on “goal difficulty
level” and “monetary incentive types” (see Lee, Locke, & Phan,
1997; Mowen, Middlemist, & Luther, 1981), such that incentives would not be effective unless the individual set a difficult
goal and such goals would lead to a higher level of performance under the pay-for-performance system than under the
pay-for-goal-attainment (GA-bonus) and pay-for-participation
(the hourly flat rate) systems. Therefore, HSEs would be more
responsive to monetary incentives to the extent that managers
apply pay for performance and instruct these individuals to set
hard goals.
Practically, personal goals are important to employees in
order to appraise themselves through the achievement of these
goals. Himmelweit (1947, p. 41) points out that “knowledge of
the goal a person sets himself is important for the true appraisal
of the efficacy of his behaviour and for the understanding of
his reaction to environmental stress.” Similarly, personal goals
are important to management and organizations. This is because
it is strongly believed that personal goals influence behavior
(Kanfer, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1990), and, accordingly, managers can expect high job performance from employees who set
hard goals (Campbell, 1982). On the macro level, Baum and
Locke (2004) found that a chief executive officer (CEO) average annual sales growth has a direct effect on venture growth.
In addition, it is often argued that the goals of an individual are
not always the same as those of the organization (Austin, 1989).
Therefore, instructing subordinates to set hard goals for themselves is especially important in order for managers to align
the interests of their employees with those of the organization.
Self-set hard goal instruction causes employees not only to set
high personal goals but also to increase their commitment to
the goal (since employees should be committed to the goals
they set for themselves; see Locke & Latham, 1990), which, in
turn, enhances goal attainment and performance. Self-set hard
goal instruction could be an effective managerial tool in participative decision-making programs such as management by
objectives.
Furthermore, monetary incentives have been an important
tool that managers have utilized to motivate their employees. However, there is much confusion surrounding incentives’
effectiveness in the workplace since they do not always generate a high response from workers. Research, however, shows
that the boundary conditions under which monetary incentives
operate are important. According to Locke, Bryan, and Kendall

149

(1968), monetary incentive plans do not work automatically by
themselves and do not operate in a vacuum. The integration of
self-set goal level instructions and self-esteem with monetary
incentives is crucial in order for managers to guarantee that
such a system is producing the desired influence. Moreover,
such integration should be valuable to managers and organizations because it deals with a complex model of motivation and
this model fits well with the increasing complexity of organizational reality, the diversity of the workplace, and the pressure
over managers and organizations today to do well. Such integration with its complex set of variables may contribute more
to organizational success than does each variable individually.
Recent research has shown that “individual, organizational, and
environmental research domains predict venture growth better
when the web of complex indirect relationships among them is
included than when only multiple simultaneous direct effects
are studied” (Baum et al., 2001, p. 299). Baum and Locke
(2004) show that entrepreneurial traits and situationally specific motivation such as goals and self-efficacy are related to
subsequent venture growth. In addition, organizational life is
filled with demands that managers place upon their subordinates
to fulfill. Therefore, managers should understand the determinants of personal goals and how such determinants interact to
influence employees’ behavior in order for managers to help
their employees set goals that are challenging, attainable, and
rewarding.
The objectives of this research, therefore, are twofold: (a)
to examine the interactive effects of monetary incentive types,
that is, straight piece rate, hourly flat rate, and differential piece
rate with goal attainment step bonus (GA-bonus), self-set goal
level instructions (hard, easy, any, & no goal instructions), and
self-esteem on personal goals and goal attainment; and (b) to
investigate the mediating role of personal goals, self-efficacy (a
person’s belief about performing a task; see Bandura, 1986),
and goal commitment (a determination to try for a goal; see
Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988) on the effects of this interaction
on performance.
Figure 1 shows the expected relationships among the
research variables. Personal goals are defined in the present
research to refer to an individual’s future performance intention. Goals are desired objects and do not necessarily cause
the individual to act unless he/she intends to do so (Locke &
Latham, 1990). Goal intention is a powerful predictor of action
(Bandura, 1986; Locke, 1968) and is equivalent to personal
goals because it includes the component of intent (Tubbs &
Ekeberg, 1991), which makes personal goals the strongest motivator (Wright & Kacmar, 1995). In addition, goal intention
terminates thinking about alternative goals (competing goals)
and it ties the person to the desired goals so that he/she is committed to act upon them (Dholakia & Bagozzi, 2003). Several
researchers (e.g., Frank, 1938; Gardner, 1940; Himmelweit,
1947) asked participants to report their “intended goals” instead
of simply asking them to set their goals.
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Independent
Variables

Mediating
Variables

Dependent
Variables

Self-Esteem
×

Self-Set
Goal Level
Instructions

Personal Goals

1. Hard Goal
2. Easy Goal
3. Any Goal
4. No Goal

Goal Commitment

Performance
and
Goal Attainment

×
Self-Efficacy

Monetary
Incentive Types
1. Piece Rate
2. Differential
Piece Rate with
Goal Attainment
Step Bonus (GABonus)
3. Hourly Flat Rate

FIG. 1.

Relationships among the research variables.

HYPOTHESES
Situational Influences on Personal Goals: Self-Set Goal
Level Instructions and Monetary Incentive Types
Based on the goal theory that asserts that hard goals produce a higher level of performance than easy goals or “do your
best goals” (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002), the present research
hypothesizes that instruction to set hard goals causes individuals to set higher goals and to have higher goal attainment and
performance than instruction to set easy or any goals. High
demands placed on individuals by significant others arouse normative expectations and communicate to them the expected
high level of performance (Locke & Latham, 2002), which
cause them to set higher goals than the goals that they would
have normally set without such instruction. Instruction to set
any goal is expected to cause individuals to set, in general, average goals since most individuals would set neither very high
goals nor very low goals.
Several studies found that requests by an authority figure to
set hard goals (Andrews & Farris, 1972; Forward & Zander,
1971; Harkins and Lowe, 2000; Strang, 1981) and instructions to set arbitrary and unreasonably high anchors (Hinsz,
Kalnbach, & Lorentz, 1997) cause participants to choose significantly hard goals.
The present research also hypothesizes that the combination
of self-set goal level instruction and monetary incentives should
produce better results than either one alone (see Lee, 1988).
Monetary incentives increase goal level, goal commitment, performance, self regulation (Condly, Clark, & Stolovitch, 2003;
Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990,

2002), valences of job performance (see Vroom, 1964), and
attractiveness of goal attainment (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987).
However, the effect of incentives on personal goals and performance may differ depending on the type of incentive (i.e.,
pay for performance, pay for goal attainment [GA-bonus], and
pay for participation [hourly flat rate]) offered by the organization. Researchers argue that tying monetary rewards to goal
attainment causes the individual to set lower goals (Locke &
Latham, 1984; Wood, Atkins, & Bright, 1999; Wright, 1989;
Wright & Kacmar, 1995) and to perform worse (Lee et al., 1997;
Mowen et al., 1981) than tying rewards to either performance
or participation. Accordingly, the present research hypothesizes
that individuals should set higher goals and have higher goal
attainment under the piece-rate plans than under the GA-bonus
and hourly flat-rate plans. This is because goals give direction and cause people to focus attention toward goal-relevant
activities (Locke, 2004; Locke & Latham, 2002). Such focused
attention, however, would be different under various monetary
incentive plans because such plans have different monetary values for setting and achieving personal goals such that under the
piece-rate plans, each unit produced is rewarded with no punishment for not achieving personal goals, causing individuals
to focus their attention on “goal level” and to set the highest
level of personal goals to maximize the effects of incentives.
Under the GA-bonus plans, by contrast, individuals will be punished for failure to reach their personal goals, causing them to
focus their attention on “goal attainment” and to set the lowest level of personal goals to avoid losing the bonus. Under the
hourly plans, individuals receive a flat fee for their participation, and, accordingly, there are neither rewards for achieving,
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nor punishments for not achieving, their personal goals, causing them to set goals that are somewhat higher than those goals
set by individuals working under the GA-bonus plans (since the
latter have the most to lose).
Based on the preceding arguments, the present research
hypothesizes that monetary incentive types should interact with
self-set goal level instructions such that under the three incentive types, the self-set hard goal instruction would lead to higher
personal goals and higher goal attainment than the self-set easy
and any goal instructions (due to the goal level effects); however, the strength of the differences in personal goals and goal
attainment across self-set goal level instructions would vary as
a function of monetary incentive types. That is, under the piecerate plans, the self-set hard goal instruction will result in the
highest level of personal goals and goal attainment as compared to the easy and any goal instructions, whereas under the
GA-bonus and hourly plans, the self-set hard goal instruction
would result in somewhat higher personal goals and goal attainment than the self-set easy and any goal instructions. However,
such interaction should vary as a function of an individual’s
perception of his/her self-worth.
Personality Characteristics: Self-Esteem
An individual’s perception of self-worth is crucial to the
full understanding of his/her level of aspiration (i.e., personal future performance goals) and its attainment (see, Lewin
et al., 1944). However, linking personality characteristics to
goal-setting behavior has produced inconsistent and conflicting
results (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002; Locke, Shaw, Saari, &
Latham, 1981; Weiss & Adler, 1984). This is partially because
the research design that tested personality variables was based
on assigned goals rather than on self-set goals, which masked
the personality effects by making situational demands stronger
(Locke et al., 1981; Weiss & Adler, 1984). Although in the last
two decades much research has been done on goal setting and
personality, additional research is needed since less is known
about the role of personality regarding the choice of difficult
goals and persistence (Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997).
Locke et al. (1981) and level-of-aspiration research assert
that self-esteem is one of the most important personality characteristics that influence an individual’s choice of his/her personal
goal. Self-esteem is defined as “a positive or negative attitude
toward a particular object, namely, the self” (Rosenberg, 1968,
p. 5). HSEs consider themselves worthy, while low-self-esteem
individuals (LSEs) consider themselves unworthy (Rosenberg,
1968).
Korman’s (1970) self-consistency theory predicts that people
behave in a manner consistent with their self-image. In addition,
Hall’s (1971) psychological success model and Hall and Foster
(1977) assert that the generalized self-confidence of HSEs will
cause them to set harder goals and have higher goal attainment
and performance than low self-esteem individuals (LSEs). More
recent research shows that HSEs are more likely to set higher
goals (Levy & Baumgardner, 1991; Pilegge & Holtz, 1997),
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accept and try for challenging goals (Tharenou & Harker, 1984),
and are high achievers and more resilient when confronted with
hardship (Gardner & Pierce, 1998) than LSEs.
While it is theoretically established that self-esteem should
positively influence personal goals, research results found no
support for the interactive effects of self-esteem and goal
difficulty on personal goals and performance (see Martin &
Murberger, 1994; Tang & Reynolds, 1993), as well as the
main effect of self-esteem on the choice of difficult goals (e.g.,
Hollenbeck & Brief, 1987), personal goals, and performance
(e.g., Kalnback & Hinsz, 1999).
Similarly, the relationship between monetary incentives and
self-esteem on performance is not clear and inconclusive, partially because of the paucity of research in this area. Prior
research (i.e., Hechler and Wiener, 1974; Terborg et al., 1980)
argues that HSEs will not be responsive to the effects of contingent rewards because of their personality disposition to behave
effectively, while LSEs will because they need the money to do
well. However, Hechler and Wiener (1974) found mixed support for the interaction of self-esteem and expected pay level,
and Terborg et al. (1980) found no evidence of the interaction
between pay and self-esteem for effort, quantity and quality of
performance. Additional research is needed because it is difficult to believe that HSEs will be indifferent to the effects of
money. Monetary incentives can satisfy intrinsic and extrinsic
needs, especially since, according to Korman (1970), the HSE
is a need-satisfying individual. Researchers (i.e., Korman, 1970;
Lawler, 1970) argue that HSEs would be responsive to incentives to the extent that a monetary incentive system provides
desirable rewards for high performance (see Korman, 1970;
Lawler, 1970). Since Lee et al. (1997) and Mowen et al. (1981)
argue that the combination of assigned hard goals and pay for
performance (piece-rate system) will lead to desirable rewards,
the present research hypothesizes that the highest level of personal goals, goal attainment, and performance should occur for
HSEs who are instructed to set hard goals and are offered pay
for performance.
The Interactive Effects of Self-Set Goal Level Instructions,
Monetary Incentive Types, and Self-Esteem on Personal
Goals and Goal Attainment
According to Keppel (1982), a significant three-way interaction is present when the interactive effect between two of
the independent variables, on the dependent variable, is not the
same at different levels of the third independent variable.
Accordingly, the interactive effects of monetary incentive
types and self-set goal instructions explained earlier will be
different at various levels of self-esteem such that under the
piece-rate plans (that pay for performance with no punishment for not reaching one’s goal), HSEs are expected to have
the highest level (while LSEs are expected to have a somewhat higher level) of personal goals and goal attainment in
the hard goal instruction as compared to the easy and any
goal instructions, due to the personality disposition of HSEs
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to behave effectively (see Hall, 1972; Korman, 1970) and the
fact that HSEs evaluate their self-worth not only by exceeding their personal standard of excellence but also by exceeding
the social standard of excellence within their environment (see
Frank, 1935).
Although LSEs are predisposed to behave in an ineffective
manner, the incentives provided by the piece-rate plans will give
them a motivational reason to somewhat increase their personal
goals and goal attainment in the hard goal instruction as compared to the easy and any goal instructions in order to obtain the
money.
However, under the GA-bonus plans (where participants will
be punished if their personal goals are not achieved) and the
hourly plans (where participants receive neither rewards nor
punishment for achieving or not achieving their personal goals,
respectively), HSEs will function somewhat effectively by setting somewhat higher goals and having somewhat higher goal
attainment under the hard goal instruction than under the easy
and any goal instructions. This may be attributed to intrinsic rewards that are associated with task performance (see
Hechler & Winner, 1974; Judge, Bono, & Locke, 2005; Locke
et al., 1981; Terborg et al., 1980; Yukl & Latham, 1978).
Judge et al. (2005, p. 1) found that “individuals with positive
self-regard were more likely to pursue goals for intrinsic and
identified (value congruent) reasons.” However, LSEs will show
no significant differences in personal goals and goal attainment
among the self-set goal level instructions. In other words, there
are both personality and situational (goal-setting) reasons for
HSEs to function somewhat effectively under the GA-bonus and
hourly plans, while LSEs have neither the personality nor the
situational reasons to do well.
Hypothesis 1: A three-way interaction among monetary incentive types, self-esteem, and self-set goal level instructions in influencing personal goals and goal attainment is
expected such that:
(A) Under the piece-rate plans, for HSEs, the self-set
hard goal instruction will result in the highest level

of personal goals and goal attainment as compared
to the self-set easy and self-set any goal instructions,
respectively, whereas for LSEs, the self-set hard goal
instruction will result in a somewhat higher level of
personal goals and goal attainment than the self-set
easy and self-set any goal instructions, respectively.
(B) Under the GA-bonus and the hourly plans, for HSE,
the self-set hard goal instruction will result in a somewhat higher level of personal goals and goal attainment
than the self-set easy and self-set any goal instructions,
respectively, whereas for LSEs there will be no significant differences in personal goals and goal attainment
among self-set hard, self-set easy, and self-set any goal
instructions.
Figure 2 shows a diagram of these three-way interactions.
The Mediating Effects of Personal Goals, Self-Efficacy,
and Goal Commitment on the Independent
Variables–Performance Relationship
Locke’s (2001) motivational hub model asserted that personal goals, goal commitment, and self-efficacy should mediate the effects of personality and situational variables on
performance. Self-efficacy is defined as task-specific selfconfidence—that is, an individual believes that he/she can
perform the task (Bandura, 1997). Lee et al. (1997) found that
personal goals and self-efficacy mediated the interactive effects
of assigned difficult goals and incentives types on performance.
Baum and Locke (2004) found that self-efficacy and goals had
direct effects on venture growth and that these variables mediated the effects of entrepreneurial traits on subsequent growth.
However, a review of the literature reveals that the process by
which monetary incentives influence performance is not clear
and the research evidence is mixed (Locke, 2001). For example, while several studies (i.e., Lee et al., 1997; Wright, 1989)
found that personal goals and self-efficacy mediate the effects
of incentives on performance, other studies have shown mixed
results (see Lee et al., 1997; Locke, 2001; Locke & Latham,
Low Self-Esteem

FIG. 2.
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2002; Riedel, Nebeker, & Cooper, 1988; Wood et al., 1999;
Wright, 1989; Wright & Kacmar, 1995; Yukl & Latham, 1978).
Similarly, although personality factors are related to motivation
and performance (through self-regulatory mechanisms such as
goal level and goal commitment; see Baum & Locke, 2004;
Erez & Judge, 2001), Lee, Sheldon, and Turban (2003) point
out that the process by which personality influences behavior is
not yet clear. Part of the problem is due to researchers using a
deficient measurement of goal commitment, a small amount of
incentives, and poor experimental design (Locke, 2001), all of
which the present research has overcome.
The present research argues that personal goals, self-efficacy,
and goal commitment should mediate the interactive effect of
self-esteem, goal instructions, and monetary incentive type on
performance such that the combination of hard goal instruction, piece-rate plans, and high self-esteem should result in
the highest level of personal goals, self-efficacy, and goal
commitment, which, in turn, leads to the highest level of
performance.
Instruction to set hard goals arouses normative expectation
and causes an individual to set high goals and have high goal
commitment (see Lee et al., 1997; Locke et al., 1988). Self-set
goals imply volition, which, in turn, increases goal commitment
(Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987). In addition, instruction to set challenging goals can also raise an individual’s self-efficacy because
such instruction is an expression of confidence in his/her ability
to perform effectively (see Locke & Latham, 2002). Similarly,
monetary incentives should increase goal commitment because
they increase the attractiveness of goal attainment, which, in
turn, increases performance (see Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987),
especially under the pay for performance and self-set hard
goal instruction that should result in high payoffs. Monetary
incentives should also increase self-efficacy because receiving
incentives for high personal goals and performance implies task
success and high competency (see Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001)
and increases performance through better task strategies that
are needed to achieve those high goals (see Lee et al., 1997;
Wright & Kacmar, 1995). Bandura (1986) argues that monetary incentives (pay for performance) will not be effective unless
an individual is able to perform the task effectively in order to
receive the incentives.
In addition, HSEs are expected to have high personal goals
and goal commitment (see Hall, 1971). Because HSEs have
high self-confidence, they probably have high expectancy of
achieving hard goals, which leads to high goal commitment
and performance (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987). Moreover, HSEs
are expected to have higher self-efficacy than LSEs, which
is consistent with Gardner and Pierce’s (1998) argument that
self-esteem should positively be related to self-efficacy.
Hypothesis 2: Personal goals, self-efficacy, and goal commitment would mediate the interactive effects of the independent variables (self-esteem, monetary incentive types, and
self-set goal level instructions) on performance.
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METHODS
Experimental Design
A 4 × 3 × 2 (self-set goal level instructions [hard, easy,
any, no goal] × monetary incentives types [piece rate, hourly,
GA-bonus] × self-esteem [high, low]), between-group factorial
design was used. This design incorporates two performance sessions (the practice trial and the experimental trial) that lasted
20 minutes each. A 20-minute trial is typical in goal-setting
research (e.g., Hinsz et al., 1997; Wright, 1989).
Sample and Task
Participants were undergraduate college students who were
hired, through an advertisement placed in their college newspaper, to perform part-time, paid clerical work for a period of
2 hours. The actual sample size is 300 participants. This size
was determined by using Cohen’s (1988) methods with average
effect size. This sample size has a statistical power of .93 for
the 3 × 3 × 2 interaction (omitting the no goal condition), and
.89 for the 4 × 3 × 2 interaction. The experiment consisted of a
coding task. Each participant was given several questionnaires.
Each questionnaire was composed of 100 questions already
answered by the experimenter beforehand. Participants were
asked to code the answer to each question on this questionnaire
to a corresponding number on an IBM scantron sheet. Riedel
et al. (1988) used a similar coding task.
Pretest
The pretest data (based on 36 participants) indicated that in
a 20-minute trial, the average performance was 400 answers
correctly coded and the minimum and maximum amount of performance ranged from 300 to 1,100 correctly coded answers,
respectively.
Manipulations and Measurements
of the Research Variables
Monetary incentive types. Participants received $0.015 for
each answer correctly coded (pay for performance) under
the piece-rate plans. By contrast, participants working under
the GA-bonus plans were paid for goal attainment as follows: participants received $0.0075 for each answer correctly
coded below the attainment of their personal goals, a step
bonus of $3.00 when they achieved their personal goals, and
$0.015 for each answer correctly coded beyond the attainment of their personal goals. Under the hourly plans, participants received $6.00 for their participation, regardless of
their performance. When participants performed at an average
level in the three payment conditions, they received the same
pay as if they achieved 400 correctly coded answers (average performance). Participants then received identical pay of
$6.00 under each pay condition (piece rate [400 × $0.015 =
$6.00], hourly [$6.00 for participation], and GA-bonus plans
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[400 × $0.0075 = $3.00 + $3.00 step bonus for reaching personal goals = $6.00]). In the no-goal condition, a differential
piece rate with a step bonus was applied. Under this type, participants received $0.0075 for each answer correctly coded below
the average performance (400 answers correctly coded), a step
bonus of $3.00 when they achieve this average performance,
and $0.015 for each answer correctly coded beyond the attainment of their average performance (400 × $0.0075 = $3.00 +
$3.00 step bonus for reaching average performance = $6.00).
Self-set goal level instructions. In the self-set hard goal
instruction, participants were told that the experimenter had an
approaching deadline to finish coding the questionnaires, and
that the participants should set difficult goals for themselves,
and work very hard to reach these goals. In the self-set easy goal
instruction, participants were told to relax and set easy goals for
themselves that could easily be reached. In the self-set any goal
instruction, participants were told that they were free to set any
goal that they would work to reach. In the no goal instruction,
participants neither set nor received instructions about goals.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured by the Rosenberg
self-esteem inventory scale (Rosenberg, 1968). This inventory
is a 10-item measure, consisting of a 4-point scale with answers
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. A reliability coefficient (test–retest) of .85 was reported by Robinson
and Shaver (1973). In this study, the reliability coefficient is
.83 (Cronbach’s alpha). Self-esteem is treated in the regression
analysis as a continuous variable. However, in order to explain
the regression results, the data were plotted by taking the top
and bottom third (ignoring the middle one-third) of the selfesteem scale. This resulted in 104 HSEs and 75 LSEs. This is
very important because the measure of self-esteem is skewed,
and therefore, using the mean or the midpoint is not appropriate (see Baumeister et al., 1989, 2003). Baumeister et al. (1989)
examined the mean of self-esteem scales in 23 studies and found
that such skewed distribution is a pattern and is a function of
the self-esteem scale, in general, rather than of a specific scale,
in particular. Several researchers have used the top and bottom
third to determine HSEs and LSEs (see Martin & Murberger,
1994; Terborg et al., 1980).
Personal goals (performance-goal intention). Participants
were asked to set their goals as a percent improvement in performance in the experimental trial above their performance
in the practice trial (to prevent them from setting goals that
are equal to or lower than their practice trial performance).
Participants were completely free to choose the performance
improvement that, in their own judgment, reflected the goal
level (i.e., hard, easy, or any goal instructions) communicated to
them. Participants were asked to indicate the number of answers
that they intended to correctly code in the experimental trial.
Based on the pretest results, participants were provided with
the following levels of correctly coded answers to choose from:
300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, and 1100.
Performance. Performance is the number of correctly
coded answers in the second trial.

Goal attainment. Goal attainment is the difference between
participants’ performance in the second trial and their personal goals. A positive number means a participant is exceeding
the goal, zero means he/she is meeting the goal, and a negative number means he/she is missing the goal. The magnitude
indicates by how much the difference is. Other researchers
(e.g., Donovan & Williams, 2003) as well as level-of-aspiration
research have used goal-performance discrepancies to measure
goal attainment.
Goal commitment. Goal commitment was measured by five
items (items 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7), adopted from Hollenbeck,
William, and Klein’s (1989) measure of goal commitment (nine
items rated on a 7-point scale). Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck,
Wright, & DeShon (2001) examined the nine-item scale proposed by Hollenbeck et al. using 2,918 participants and found
the five-item scale to be the best predictor of the unidimensional
aspect of the goal commitment measure. In the present research,
the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of the five items
already mentioned is .77.
Self-efficacy. Participants’ beliefs about self-efficacy were
obtained using the self-efficacy scale, adopted with modification, from Locke et al. (1984), whose scale was itself based on
Bandura’s conceptualization of self-efficacy. Participants were
asked to indicate their certainty (ranging from 0%, extremely
low chances, to 100%, extremely high chances) in achieving
11 different levels of performance (ranging from very easy
[correctly coding 100 answers] to very difficult [correctly coding 1,100 answers]) in a 20-minute work period (self-efficacy
strength). In the first column, at each level of performance, participants were asked to indicate whether they could perform at
that level by responding either yes or no (self-efficacy magnitude). Self-efficacy strength is combined with self-efficacy
magnitude by the summation of certainty measures of performance for only those participants who answered yes in the first
column. The reliability coefficient (alpha) of this scale is .84.
Practice trial performance. Practice trial performance
refers to the actual number of correctly coded answers in the
first trial. Practice trial performance serves as a measure of ability (see Lee et al., 1997); accordingly, it used in the present
research as a control variable to eliminate any possibility of
ability differences in the individual cells, since the focus of
the present research is on the motivational differences rather
than ability differences in personal goals, goal attainment, and
performance.
Procedures
Participants were randomly and individually assigned to the
experimental conditions. Upon arrival, each participant signed
the census form, responded to the Rosenberg self-esteem inventory, and performed a 20-minute practice trial. Upon the completion of this trial, each participant was informed that he/she
had already earned $6.00 for his/her participation in the practice trial and that he/she would receive additional money for
participating in the experimental trial (those working under the
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hourly conditions were told that they would receive an additional $6.00 for their participation). For ethical reasons, no
participant received less than a total of $12.00 but was made
aware of this fact only after the completion of the experiment.
Each participant was given feedback about his/her actual performance (number of answers correctly coded) in the practice
trial, was given the incentive type and goal instruction manipulations, was asked to set a goal, was asked to respond to
self-efficacy and goal commitment measures, and was asked
to perform the 20-minute experimental trial. Upon completion,
participants responded to questions regarding money and goal
manipulations. The debriefing followed.
RESULTS
Checking the Validity of the Experimental Manipulations
Monetary incentive types. Participants were provided with
a one-item scale with three alternatives: piece rate, hourly, GAbonus, and differential piece rate with a step bonus plans (a
control group), and were asked to check the payment system
applied to them. The result indicates that participants correctly
checked the payment system applied to them, and, accordingly,
they understood the manipulation of the monetary incentive
types.
Self-set goal level instructions. Participants were asked to
describe the self-set goal level instructions applied to them.
They were provided with a one-item scale with four alternatives describing the goal conditions. The result demonstrates
that in the hard, easy, any, and no goal instructions, participants correctly described the goal manipulation applied to them,
and, accordingly, they understood the manipulation of self-set
goal level instructions. To further check on goal manipulation,
participants were asked to rate their personal goals in terms of
difficulty using a single-item scale ranging from 1 (a very easy
goal) to 7 (a very difficult goal). Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
shows that the main effect of the self-report of goal difficulty
among goal instructions is significant, F(2, 222) = 230,315,
p = .000. Tukey least significant differences (LSD) at the
.05 level show that the goal difficulty rating was significantly
higher in the hard goal instruction (M = 5.80, SD = .87) than
in the easy (M = 2.23, SD = .82) and any goal (M = 4.21,
SD = 1.31) instructions, indicating that the manipulation of goal
instruction was understood by participants.
Perception of control over the choice of personal goals.
Using a one-item scale with five alternatives ranging from 1 (not
at all) to 5 (very much), participants were asked to indicate the
degree of their control over the choice of their personal goals.
ANOVA shows that the main effect of control over goal choice
among goal instructions is significant, F(2, 222) = 11,528,
p = .000. The Tukey LSD at the .05 level shows that control
over goal choice was significantly higher in the any goal instruction (M = 4.71, SD = .51) than in the easy goal instruction
(M = 4.20, SD = .82) and hard goal instruction (M = 4.19,
SD = .88). All participants in each goal instruction condition
reported high control over goal choice, exceeding a 4.00 out
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of 5.00 score. These results indicate that participants have high
perception of control over goal choice, especially in the any goal
conditions.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the inter-correlation and the partial correlation (controlling for the practice trial performance) matrix, and
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the research
variables under all the experimental conditions.
Examination of Table 1 reveals no sign of multicollinearity
except the correlation between the practice trial performance
and performance (r = .73), and between personal goals and goal
attainment (r = .66). However, the first correlation is expected
since both constructs share considerable variance because they
are the same variable taken at different times. The second correlation is also expected since both variables share considerable
variance, since goal attainment is the difference between performance and personal goals. Figures in parentheses represent the
sample size of 300 where the no-goal conditions are included
and 225 where the no-goal conditions are excluded. Controlling
for the practice trial performance enhances the magnitude of
some correlations (i.e., the correlations between self-efficacy
and goal attainment, between performance and goal attainment,
between goal attainment and personal goals), but reduces the
magnitude of other correlations (i.e., the correlations between
self-efficacy and personal goals, between self-efficacy and performance, and between personal goals and performance). It is
important to indicate that self-efficacy still correlates significantly with the research variables even after controlling for the
practice trial performance.
Statistical Test of the Research Hypotheses
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the research
hypotheses. Because monetary incentive types and self-set goal
level instructions are categorical variables, they must be examined in the regression as dummy variables. Since monetary
incentive type has three categories, only two dummy variables
will be needed to represent the three categories holding constant the effects of the hourly flat-rate plans; since self-set goal
level instruction has four categories, only three categories will
be needed to represent the four categories holding constant the
effects of the no-goal conditions. Accordingly, monetary incentive types were dummy coded as two variables (piece rate,
GA-bonus, and hourly, coded 1, 0; 0, 1; and 0, 0, respectively).
Self-set goal level instructions were dummy coded as three variables (hard, easy, any, and no goals) coded 1, 0, 0; 0, 1, 0; 0, 0,
1; and 0, 0, 0, respectively).
Before examining the hypothesized three-way interaction, it
is important to examine the main effects of monetary incentive types and self-set goal level instructions on personal goals,
since such an explanation can help in the interpretation of the
results. Table 3, Section A, shows that (after controlling for
the effects of the practice trial performance), the main effects
of monetary incentive types and self-set goal level instructions
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32.77
(300)
44.57
(225)
574.04
(225)
602.22
(300)
423.32
(300)
56.77
(298)
24.71
(225)

M
5.213

SD

4.22

18.25

107.60

143.59

176.80

163.67

p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.

7. Goal
commitment

5. Practice trial
performance
6. Self-efficacy

2. Goal
attainment
3. Personal goals
(intention)
4. Performance

1. Self-esteem

Variables

−.07
(225)
.08
(225)
.03
(300)
.06
(300)
.17∗∗
(300)
.27∗∗∗
(225)

1

−.66∗∗∗
(225)
.33∗∗∗
(300)
.06
(225)
−.12
(225)
.03
(225)

2

.49∗∗∗
(225)
.51∗∗∗
(225)
.54∗∗∗
(225)
.02
(225)

3

A – Correlation among variables

.73∗∗∗
(300)
.51∗∗∗
(300)
.07
(225)

4

.57∗∗∗
(300)
.001
(225)

5

.07
(225)

6

.13∗
(222)
.27∗∗∗
(222)

−.08
(222)
.04
(222)
−.07
(222)
(222)

1

−.21∗∗
(222)
.03
(222)

−.80∗∗∗
(222)
.41∗∗∗
(222)
(222)

2

.33∗∗∗
(222)
.02
(222)

.21∗∗
(222)
(222)

3

.17∗∗
(222)
.07
(222)

(222)

4

6

(222) .07
(222)

(222)

5

B – Partial correlation controlling for the practice
trial performance

TABLE 1
Intercorrelation and partial correlation matrix of all variable measures
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TABLE 2
Means and standard deviations of all variables
Method of payment
Straight piece rate
Self-set goal
level instructions
1 – Hard goals

Variables
Personal goals
(intention)
Goal attainment
Performance
Practice trial
performance
Self-efficacy

2 – Easy goals

Goal
commitment
Personal goals
(intention)
Goal attainment
Performance
Practical trial
performance
Self-efficacy

3 – Any goals

Goal
commitment
Personal goals
(intention)
Goal attainment
Performance
Practice trial
performance
Self-efficacy

4 – No goalsa

Goal
commitment
Performance
Practice trial
performance
Self-efficacy

HSE
750.00
(171.59)
−.72.90
(222.84)
677.10
(138.73)
404.00
(98.43)
66.20
(6.07)
26.30
(2.79)
533.33
(115.47)
56.67
(110.32)
590.00
(119.70)
427.42
(123.65)
62.75
(19.70)
25.08
(3.29)
580.00
(147.57)
118.20
(148.64)
698.20
(161.97)
467.10
(135.24)
61.90
(13.09)
25.80
(3.39)
546.64
(106.81)
384.82
(105.10)
62.55
(25.58)

LSE
540.00
(114.02)
123.60
(51.09)
663.60
(112.25)
445.80
(87.87)
59.20
(10.16)
22.60
(3.58)
500.00
(63.25)
133.83
(148.61)
633.83
(137.99)
370.83
(71.98)
51.83
(12.22)
23.50
(3.45)
680.00
(248.99)
18.80
(303.56)
698.80
(107.40)
390.60
(132.87)
57.80
(11.10)
22.40
(1.82)
638.17
(99.19)
496.17
(113.90)
51.83
(18.00)

Hourly flat rate
HSE
660.00
(151.66)
−.72.00
(148.49)
588.00
(159.99)
433.00
(106.19)
71.80
(25.83)
25.60
(4.45)
572.00
(122.15)
32.40
(51.24)
604.40
(112.22)
444.00
(81.02)
56.80
(8.32)
25.00
(4.36)
500.00
(130.93)
95.00
(84.64)
595.00
(126.01)
422.75
(97.46)
60.88
(18.48)
24.13
(4.45)
518.00
(173.24)
411.75
(116.82)
55.00
(12.90)

Differential piece
rate/GA-bonus

LSE

HSE

LSE

462.50
(91.61)
89.88
(63.38)
552.38
(123.86)
368.38
(80.31
50.50
(10.46)
23.38
(3.58)
514.29
(146.39)
65.14
(76.11)
579.43
(157.32)
431.71
(127.34)
55.14
(16.09)
21.00
(6.68)
485.71
(89.97)
108.86
(203.49)
594.57
(153.95)
370.43
(98.32)
53.14
(10.92)
22.43
(3.55)
431.25
(101.72)
340.25
(76.75)
45.00
(15.15)

511.11
(60.09)
127.22
(70.31)
638.33
(26.43)
421.33
(66.93)
54.67
(7.78)
26.00
(3.50)
618.18
(244.21)
−23.27
(216.72)
594.91
(142.67)
444.64
(110.38)
53.00
(12.11)
28.54
(2.66)
671.43
(170.43)
40.00
(157.29)
711.43
(182.73
511.00
(124.16)
69.14
(26.07)
29.14
(1.95)
640.00
(111.55)
489.63
(83.38)
66.75
(17.75)

720.00
(277.49)
−.35.60
(83.26)
684.40
(206.79)
478.80
(130.65)
61.40
(29.89)
20.20
(6.14)
483.33
(147.20)
44.67
(142.55)
528.00
(153.80)
354.83
(108.59)
34.33
(17.56)
26.00
(6.20)
540.00
(114.02)
72.40
(65.84)
612.40
(64.77)
425.60
(54.80)
57.00
(10.20)
24.80
(2.05)
610.00
(225.38)
492.57
(190.65)
50.57
(35.50)

Note. Figures in parentheses are the standard deviations. HSE = high self-esteem. LSE = low self-esteem.
a
Personal goals, goal attainment, and goal commitment are not applicable under this condition. Sample size: hard goal/piece rate: HSE 10,
LSE 5; hard goal/hourly: HSE 5, LSE 8; hard goal/bonus: HSE 9, LSE 5. Easy goal/piece rate: HSE 12, LSE 6; easy goal/hourly: HSE 5, LSE
7; easy goal/bonus: HSE 11, LSE 6. Any goal/piece rate: HSE 10, LSE 5; any goal/hourly: HSE 8, LSE 7; any goal/bonus: HSE 7, LSE 5.
No goal/piece rate: HSE 11, LSE 6; no goal/hourly: HSE 8, LSE 8; no goal/bonus: HSE 8, LSE 7.
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∗

p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.

Step 3. Two-way interaction
SSGLIs × MIT
SE × SSGLIs
SE × MIT
Step 4. Three-way interaction
HG × Piece Rate × SE
EG × Piece Rate × SE
AG × Piece Rate × SE
HG × GA-Bonus × SE
EG × GA-Bonus × SE
AG × GA-Bonus × SE
Equation

Step 1. Practice trial
performance
Step 2. The main effects
Self-esteem (SE)
Self-set goal level
instructions (SSGLIs)
Hard goals (HG)
Easy goals (EG)
Any goals (AG)
Monetary incentive
types (MIT)
Straight piece rate
(Piece Rate)
Differential piece rate with
GA-bonus (GA-Bonus)

Independent variables and
interactions

.847

4.0∗∗∗

2.7∗∗∗

.047

7.5∗∗∗

7.45∗∗∗ .137

.394

.394

4.44∗∗∗

7.98∗∗∗ .02

.068

17.6∗∗∗

.326

77.4∗∗∗

F

.347

.258

R2

77.4∗∗∗

F

.258

R2

R2

1.28
.71
5.06∗
.11

13.75
−8.91
−26.68
−3.77

2.2
1.2
.59

.90

23.02

87.48
−5.04
−3.6

9.2∗∗

73.73

.097

.097

.05

1.22

1.2

.82

.092

.045

.02

1.2

2.55∗

.58

7.31

13.71
30.80

−.768

.32

1.3
5.27∗

.00

.50
.38
.98

.02

−3.39

46.68
3.2
5.23

.05

.55

4.5∗

1.38

.82

F

−5.77

−20.02

4.2∗

49.32

.095

B-weight

−56.90

1.2

.82

F

12.1∗∗∗

.027

.004

R2

83.90

1.15

.82

F

−2.38

.03

77.4∗∗∗ .004

F

B. The effects on goal attainment

.04

.379

.86

B-weight

A. The effects on personal goals (EQ-2)

TABLE 3
The effects on personal goals and goal attainment
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are found to be significant in influencing personal goals. The
significant, F(2, 222) = 3.86, p = .020, main effect of incentives shows that the highest level of personal goals is set under
the piece-rate plans (M = 613.33, SD = 185.51), followed
by the GA-bonus plans (M = 574.67, SD = 171.71) and
hourly plans (M = 534.13, SD = 165.96), respectively. The
Tukey LSD at the .05 significance level indicates that personal
goals are significantly higher under the piece-rate plans than
under the hourly plans and the GA-bonus plans. In addition,
the significant main effect of self-set goal level instructions,
F(2, 222) = 7.37, p = .0006, on personal goals shows that the
highest level of personal goals is set under the hard goal instruction (M = 618.67, SD = 189.38), followed by the any goal
instruction (M = 589.33, SD = 172.87) and easy goal instruction (M = 514.13, SD = 151.60), respectively. The Tukey LSD
test indicates that personal goals set under the hard and any
goal instructions are significantly higher than those set under
the easy goal instruction. The results of the main effects of monetary incentive type and goal instructions on personal goals are
consistent with the argument of the present research.
Hypothesis 1, which stated that self-esteem, monetary incentive types, and self-set goal level instructions would significantly
interact to influence personal goals and goal attainment was
supported (see Table 3, sections A and B, respectively). Table 3,
section A, shows that after controlling for the effects of the practice trial performance (step 1), the main effects of monetary
incentive types, self-set goal level instructions, and self-esteem
(step 2), and the two-way interactions (step 3), the three-way
interactions are found to be significant in influencing personal
goals (p = .004, with statistical power = .90, and partial eta
squared = .07), and goal attainment (p = .040, with statistical
power = .72, and partial eta squared = .05). Table 2 reports and
Figure 3 depicts the group means of these significant three-way
interactions on personal goals and goal attainment.
To explain the just-described significant three-way interaction, a simple effect analysis should be performed. The data
was broken down by monetary incentive types (piece rate,
GA-bonus, and hourly) and under each type, variations in personal goal and goal attainment means among self-set goal level
instructions (hard, easy and any) and between HSES and LSEs
were reported (see Table 2).
Sub-Hypothesis 1A predicts that under the piece-rate plans,
for HSEs, the hard goal instruction will result in the highest
level of personal goals and goal attainment as compared to
the easy and any goal instructions, whereas for LSEs, the hard
goal instruction will result in a somewhat higher level of personal goals and goal attainment than the easy and any goal
instructions. With respect to personal goals, under the piecerate plans, for HSEs, the highest level of personal goals is set
under the hard goal instruction and these goals are significantly
higher than those set under the easy, t(29) = 3.50, p = .002, and
any, t(29) = 2.63, p = .01, goal instructions, whereas for LSEs,
personal goals are higher under the hard goal and any goal
instructions than under the easy goal instruction (see Table 2).
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This result supports Sub-Hypothesis 1A regarding HSEs, but
for LSEs this hypothesis is partially supported since although
the hard goal instruction resulted in higher personal goals than
the easy goal instruction, the highest level of personal goals was
under the any goal instruction. The nature of this interaction is
illustrated in Figure 3, which reveals that under both the straight
piece-rate plan and self-set hard goal instruction, a steeper slope
of personal goals exists for HSEs than for LSEs, which indicates
that a stronger relationship between monetary incentive types
and self-set goal level instructions in influencing personal goals
exists for the former participants than for the latter. This result
is consistent with the major argument of this research, which
indicates that the highest level of personal goals should exist for
HSEs who are instructed to set hard goals and offered pay for
performance.
With respect to goal attainment, under the piece-rate plans,
HSEs show a negative goal attainment discrepancy score in
the hard goal instruction only. Goal attainment is significantly
lower in the hard goal instruction than in the any goal instruction, t(29) = −2.44, p = .02 (the any goal instruction shows
the highest level of goal attainment, followed by the easy goal
instruction and hard goal instruction, respectively). The examination of Table 2 shows that for LSEs, the goal attainment
means are significantly higher in the hard goal instruction than
in the any goal instruction (which is in the expected direction), but the highest level of goal attainment was under the
easy goal instruction (which is not in the expected direction).
Sub-Hypothesis 1A is not supported for HSEs but is partially
supported for LSEs in terms of goal attainment. The nature of
this interaction is shown in Figure 3, which demonstrates that
a steeper slope of negative goal attainment discrepancy score
under both the straight piece-rate plan and self-set hard goal
instruction exists for HSEs than for LSEs, which indicates that a
weaker relationship between monetary incentive types and selfset goal level instructions in influencing goal attainment exists
for the former participants than for the latter.
Sub-Hypothesis 1B predicts that under both the GA-bonus
and the hourly plans, for HSEs, the hard goal instruction will
result in somewhat higher personal goals and goal attainment
than the easy and any goal instructions, whereas for LSEs,
there will be no significant differences in personal goals and
goal attainment among the self-set goal level instructions. With
respect to personal goals, under the GA-bonus plans, HSEs set
the lowest, while LSEs set the highest, level of personal goals
in the self-set hard goal instruction (see Table 2). This result
offers no support for Sub-Hypothesis 1B regarding personal
goals. With respect to goal attainment, under the GA-bonus
plans, for HSEs, the hard goal instruction shows significantly
higher goal attainment than is seen in the easy goal instruction,
t(24) = 2.023, p = .05, and is higher than that in the any goal
instruction, whereas LSEs show a negative goal attainment discrepancy score in the hard goal instruction only and the highest
level of goal attainment is achieved in the any goal instruction.
However, no significant differences in goal attainment among
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the self-set goal level instructions were found. Sub-Hypothesis
1B is supported for HSEs but partially supported for LSEs
regarding goal attainment.
Under the hourly plans, regarding personal goals, for HSEs,
personal goals in the hard goal instruction are significantly
higher than those in the any goal instruction, t(15) = 2.09,
p = .05, and are higher than those in the easy goal instruction;
however, LSEs show no significant differences in personal goals
among the self-set goal level instructions (see Table 2). This
result supports Sub-Hypothesis 1B regarding personal goals.
Regarding goal attainment, under the hourly plans, HSEs show
a negative goal attainment discrepancy score in the hard goal
instruction only. The goal attainment in the hard goal instruction is significantly lower than that in the any goal instruction,
t(15) = −2.94, p = .01, and the highest level of goal attainment was found under the any goal instruction. LSEs, however,
show no significant differences in goal attainment among the
goal level instructions (see Table 2), and the highest level of goal
attainment is found under the any goal instruction. Thus, SubHypothesis 1B is not supported for HSEs but partially supported
for LSEs regarding goal attainment.
Testing the Mediating Effects
To test the mediation, Baron and Kenny (1986) argue that
by using moderated multiple regression, three equations can be
developed: (1) The dependent variable should be regressed on
the independent variable (the independent variable must significantly influence the dependent variable); (2) the mediating
variable should be regressed on the independent variable (the
independent variable must significantly influence the mediating
variable); and (3) the dependent variable should be regressed on
the mediating and independent variables. The mediating variable must significantly influence the dependent variable, and the
effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable
should either be reduced (partial mediating effects) or entirely
disappear (complete mediating effects) after controlling for the
mediating variable.
Hypothesis 2 states that personal goals, self-efficacy, and
goal commitment would mediate the interactive effects of selfesteem, goal instructions, and monetary incentive types on
performance. In the first equation, performance is regressed on
the independent variables and their interactions (see Table 4,
Section A). The practice trial performance and the main
effects of both goal instructions and incentive types are significant in influencing performance. The Tukey LSD at the
.05 significance level shows that performance is significantly
higher under the self-set hard goal instruction (M = 632.55,
SD = 142.00) than under the self-set easy goal (M = 582.04,
SD = 138.26) and no goal (M = 553.03, SD = 143.51) instructions. However, there are no significant differences in performance between the self-set hard goal and self-set any
goal (M = 641.25, SD = 134.51) instructions. In addition,
performance is significantly higher under both the piece-rate
(M = 634.83, SD = 131.50) and GA-bonus (M = 614.07,
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SD = 142.60) plans than under the hourly (M = 557.75,
SD = 146.39) plans, respectively.
The second equation, regarding the effects on the mediators
(personal goals, self-efficacy, and goal commitment) is supported for personal goals (see Table 3, section A) and partially
supported for self-efficacy and goal commitment (see Table 5,
sections A and B, respectively). The main effects of self-set
goal level instructions and monetary incentive types are not
significant in influencing self-efficacy. However, the contrast
analysis shows that self-efficacy is significantly higher under
both the hard, t(296) = 2.63, p = .009, and any, t(296) = 3.08,
p = .002, goal instructions than under the easy goal instruction.
In addition, self-efficacy is the highest under the piece-rate plans
(M = 58.34, SD = 16.23), followed by the GA-bonus plans
(M = 56.82, SD = 20.02) and the hourly plans (M = 55.14,
SD = 18. 36), respectively. Regarding goal commitment, only
the main effect of monetary incentive types is significant, F(2,
222) = 4.24, p = .015, in influencing goal commitment. The
Tukey LSD)at the .05 significance level shows that goal commitment is significantly higher under the piece-rate (M = 25.16,
SD = 3.62), and GA-bonus (M = 25.39, SD = 4.27) plans
than under the hourly (M = 23.57, SD = 4.52) plan. Table 5
shows that the main effect of self-esteem is significant in influencing both goal commitment and self-efficacy. HSEs have
higher goal commitment and higher self-efficacy in almost all
the experimental conditions than LSEs (see Table 2).
In the third equation (see Table 4, section B), performance
is regressed on both the mediating and independent variables.
According to Table 4, section B, only self-efficacy and personal goals significantly influence performance, and controlling
for personal goals cancels out the significant main effect that
self-set goal level instruction has on performance (see Table 4,
section A for comparison). Thus, personal goals completely
mediate the main effects of self-set goal level instructions on
performance. Controlling for self-efficacy has no effects on
the relationship between the independent variables and performance as reported in Table 4, section A. Accordingly, selfefficacy and goal commitment have no mediating effects on
the described independent variables–performance relationship.
Hypothesis 2, therefore, is partially supported.

DISCUSSION
Determinants of Personal Goals
and Goal Attainment
The present research contributes to the literature of goal setting, monetary incentives, and self-esteem in many ways. First,
it shows that self-set goal level instructions, monetary incentive
types, and self-esteem significantly interact to influence personal goals and goal attainment. This finding supports Lewin
et al. (1944), who argue that level of aspiration is a complicated
concept influenced by the person–situation interaction, as well
as other researchers (e.g., Brockner, 1988) who argue that the
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∗

p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.

Step 1. Practice trial
performance
Self-efficacy beliefs (SEB)
Personal goals (PG)
Goal commitment (GC)
Step 2. The main effects
Self-esteem (SE)
Self-set goal level
instructions (SSGLIs)
Hard goals (HG)
Easy goals (EG)
Any goals (AG)
Monetary incentive types
(MIT)
Straight piece rate (Piece
Rate)
Differential piece rate with
GA-bonus (GA-Bonus)
Step 3. Two-way interaction
SSGLIs × MIT
SE × SSGLIs
SE × MIT
Step 4. Three-way interaction
HG × Piece Rate × SE
EG × Piece Rate × SE
AG × Piece Rate × SE
HG × GA-Bonus × SE
EG × GA-Bonus × SE
AG × GA-Bonus × SE
Equation

Independent variables and
interactions

.01

.005

.101

19.5∗∗∗

19.5∗∗∗

.63

.630

.08

66∗∗∗

.61

26.1∗∗∗

.529

335∗∗∗

.529

.626

R2

F

R2

3.27∗∗∗

.56

.84

10.6∗∗∗

335∗∗∗

F

−4.64
−8.49
−3.61
.54
−3.77
−.16

−34.43
−6.05
1.83

.38
1.47
.31
.005
.248
.001

.89
4.3∗
.52

.592

.591

14.0∗∗∗

14.4∗∗∗

17.1∗∗∗

.054

.004

.011

1.57

.435

.694

2.63

21.07

.589

58.16

24.6∗∗∗

64.04

1.84
.597
.637
.102

5.40
−6.34
−2.33

1.1
1.6
.73

1.03

13.6∗∗∗

1.7
.01

4.76∗

6.2∗∗
6.15∗∗∗
1.7

10.91

39.85
−3.95
−2.53

15.92

−21.00
1.32

1.23
.111
2.01

27.5∗∗∗
11.7∗∗∗
29.2∗∗∗

6.2∗∗∗
6.15∗∗∗
1.7
4.06∗∗∗

F
.959 228∗∗∗

B-weight

77.37
50.7
79.77

.014
.013
.004
.04

120∗∗∗
83.8∗∗∗
63∗∗∗
32.4∗∗∗

.519
.53
.536
.576

228∗∗∗

F

−2.75

.505

R2

278∗∗∗

F

.505

R2

1.01

335∗∗∗

F

B. The effects on performance controlling for the
effects of PG, SEB, and GC (EQ-3)

−1.02

.97

Bweight

A. The effects on performance (EQ-1)

TABLE 4
The mediating roles of personal goals (PG), self-efficacy beliefs (SEB), and goal commitment (GC) on the interactive effects
of the independent variables on performance
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∗

p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.

.04

24.6∗∗∗

.02

.085

8.1∗∗∗

8.08∗∗∗

.413

.02

.329

146∗∗∗

10∗∗∗

R2

F

.41

.39

.371

Step 2. The main effects
Self-esteem (SE)
Self-set goal level
instructions (SSGLIs)
Hard goals (HG)
Easy goals (EG)
Any goals (AG)
Monetary incentive
types (MIT)
Straight piece rate
(Piece Rate)
Differential piece rate
with GA-bonus
(GA-Bonus)

Step 3. Two-way interaction
SSGLIs × MIT
SE × SSGLIs
SE × MIT
Step 4. Three-way interaction
HG × Piece Rate × SE
EG × Piece Rate × SE
AG × Piece Rate × SE
HG × GA-Bonus × SE
EG × GA-Bonus × SE
AG × GA-Bonus × SE
Equation

.329

R2

1.72∗

1.6

.93

3.23∗∗

146∗∗∗

F

.19
1.59

.91
−2.66

−1.43
−1.52
−2.377
−2.366
−.358
−1.248

1.4
1.8
5.18∗
4.18∗
.09
1.23

1.9
2.0
2.6

1.02
1.43
1.78

2.42
−2.87
3.20

8.03
−.636
.639

8.33

∗∗

146∗∗∗

F

.475

.097

B-weight

A. The effects on self-efficacy belief (EQ-2), n = 300

Step 1. Practice trial
performance

Independent variables and
interactions

.173

.173

.163

.118

.00

R2

2.40∗∗∗

2.4∗∗∗

2.9∗∗∗

4.87∗∗∗

.00

F

.173

.01

.044

.118

.00

R2

2.54∗∗∗

.65

1.4

5.84∗∗∗

.00

F

.048

−.145

2.16
.747
1.45
.35

.255
.398
.189

4.9∗
.95
2.2

5.18∗

.498

−3.5
.13
.19

1.507

3.52

4.07∗
−1.33

1.24

15.3∗∗∗

.00

F

.20

−3.23

B-weight

B. The effects on goal commitment (EQ-2), n = 225

TABLE 5
The effects on self-efficacy beliefs and goal commitment
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effects of self-esteem can only be understood when studied in
combination with other relevant factors.
The described significant three-way interaction is particularly important because it does shed light on the confusion
regarding the relationship between monetary incentives and
self-esteem by showing that self-esteem’s responsiveness to
monetary incentives is a function of the interaction between
monetary incentive types and self-set goal level instructions.
Consistent with the present research prediction, the results show
that HSEs set the highest level of personal goals under the
piece-rate/self-set hard goal instruction condition and these
goals were significantly (d < .01; see Cohen, 1988) higher than
equivalent goals set by LSEs. Although LSEs set higher goals
under the “self-set hard goal instruction” than under the self-set
easy goal instruction, which is consistent with prediction, the
highest level of personal goals was set under the “self-set any
goal instruction,” which is against the prediction of the present
research. One explanation could be that the self-set any goal
instruction condition was more attractive than the self-set hard
goal instruction condition because it maximizes volition and
thereby enhances LSEs’ self-control and self-determination.
Accordingly, self-esteem responsiveness to pay for performance
is a function of self-set goal level instructions, such that HSEs
were more responsive to the effects of pay for performance
under the “self-set hard goal instruction,” whereas LSEs were
more responsive to the effects of pay for performance under the
“self-set any goal instruction.” The result for HSEs is consistent with the Lee et al. (1997) and Mowen et al. (1981) research,
which showed that under the piece-rate system, participants performed better under assigned hard goals than under assigned
moderate or easy goals.
Similarly, under the hourly plans/self-set hard goal instruction, HSEs set considerably higher personal goals than LSEs
(M = 660 vs. M = 462.50, respectively). This result is consistent with Terborg et al. (1980), who argue that HSEs will
be more responsive to the effects of noncontingent rewards
than LSEs. However, the present research further advances our
understanding of this relationship by showing that goal level is
an important variable—that is, HSEs’ responsiveness to noncontingent rewards is more likely to appear under the self-set
hard goal instruction than under the self-set easy and self-set
any goal instructions.
Under the GA-bonus/self-set hard goal instruction condition, the results regarding personal goals are contrary to prediction since HSEs set the lowest, and LSEs set the highest,
level of personal goals under this condition. In this regard, HSEs
behaved more rationally (by setting low goals to obtain the
bonus) than LSEs who set significantly (d < .05; see Cohen,
1988) higher goals than those set by HSEs even though such
high goals are against their financial self-interest (80% of LSEs
did not attain their goals and did not receive the bonus under this
condition). It is not clear why LSEs behaved in this irrational
way. One possible explanation for this unexpected result is that
the GA-bonus coupled with the self-set hard goal instruction

was stressful and risky, given the lack of trust LSEs had in their
ability to achieve the goal and receive the bonus. Baumeister
(1998) argues that individuals engage in self-defeating behavior
in situations characterized by emotional distress and high risk.
Although the behavior of LSEs regarding the GA-bonus plans
was not expected by the present research, it is consistent with
the dysfunctional behavior of LSEs as compared to that of HSEs
and, more importantly, it does show that HSEs and LSEs react
differently to various combinations of monetary incentive types
and self-set goal level instructions, which supports the general
arguments of the present research. However, it is important to
indicate that the sample size for LSEs under the GA-bonus/hard
goal instruction is small, and a bigger sample may show different results. Therefore, such a finding should be taken with
caution, and further replication of the present research is needed
to reexamine and assess the validity of this finding.
An interesting result is that under the GA-bonus, HSEs set
the highest level of personal goals under the any goal instruction. This result is consistent with the Lee et al. (1997) and
Mowen et al. (1981) research, which showed that under the goal
attainment bonus plans, participants performed better under
assigned moderate goal than under assigned hard goals.
Second, this research directs attention to the negative side
effects associated with pay for performance where self-set hard
goal instruction is communicated. Considering the whole sample, 29.3% of participants did not attain their goals and only
the piece rate/self-set hard goal instruction condition showed a
negative (M = −12.76) goal attainment discrepancy score (40%
of participants did not attain their goals under this condition)
among the 12 experimental conditions. Accordingly, although
the piece-rate/self-set hard goal instruction condition causes
participants to have the highest level of personal goals and performance, it also causes them to overestimate their goals and
thus to underachieve them. This finding is particularly important because previous research (e.g., Lee et al., 1997; Locke &
Latham, 1984; Mowen et al., 1981; Wright 1989) indicates that
GA-bonus plans, as compared to pay-for-performance plans,
are detrimental to goal level and performance. Yet the present
research further advances our understanding of this finding by
demonstrating that under certain conditions (i.e., self-set hard
goal instruction), there is a negative side effect (i.e., inability to
reach one’s goal) associated with the pay-for-performance systems and there is a positive side effect (achievement of one’s
goal) associated with the GA-bonus system. In addition, the
present research further advances our understanding of this finding by also demonstrating that the effects just described are
found to be a function of self-esteem. That is, in the selfset hard goal instruction, HSEs set very high goals under the
piece-rate plans but failed to achieve them, and set low goals
under the GA-bonus plans but achieved them (100% of HSEs
achieved their goals under the GA-bonus plan and goal attainment under this plan was significantly higher than that under
the piece-rate plan, t(21) = −2.63, p = .01). The focus for
HSEs was to set high goals at all costs to maximize gratification
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of self-esteem (see Frank, 1938). Although there is no punishment for failure to achieve the goal under pay for performance,
the psychological consequences could be humiliating for HSEs,
especially if the goal was under their control. Baumeister et al.
(1989, p. 551) pointed out that “it would be reckless to suggest
that people with high self-esteem are indifferent to humiliating experience.” Several researchers (e.g., Baumeister, 1998;
Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Crocker & Park,
2004, Latham & Locke, 2006; Locke, 2004) have shed light on
the negative side effects of pursuing self-esteem to the degree
that overconfidence could cause high-self-esteem individuals to
be overcommitted and willing to take big risks. In addition,
ego involvement goals (where one’s self-worth is invested in
such goals and in their attainment) can pressure an individual
to do well; however, such pressure may cause anxiety and a
reduction in an individual’s intrinsic motivation (see Deci &
Ryan, 1985; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Rawsthorne & Elliot,
1999), which hinders goal attainment. However, Bandura (1987,
p. 49) pointed out that “when people err in their self-appraisal
they tend to overestimate their capabilities,” and such overestimation is beneficial because when people act under ordinary
conditions their risk of failure may be reduced “but they would
not mount the extra effort needed to surpass their ordinary
performance.”
In short, HSEs acted in a rational and calculative way.
Under the piece-rate/self-set hard goal instruction, they overestimated their goals to maximize their outcomes, especially
since the consequences for not achieving those goals were
neither financially harmful (since there is no punishment for
not achieving them) nor self-destructive (HSEs knew that they
would bounce back in the face of adversity), and they probably believed that they could achieve those goals in any event.
Under the GA-bonus/self-set hard goal instruction, however,
HSEs became cautious in determining their goals in order to
prevent the humiliating failure of not reaching such goals and to
receive the bonus. Since HSEs are high achievers, they focused
their attention on achieving their goals by setting low ones and,
consequently, obtained gratification from achieving such goals,
which is consistent with the hedonistic assumption. The results
show that, for HSEs, the hard goal instruction ceased to work
under the GA-bonus plan in influencing personal goals but such
instruction exerted its positive influence on goal attainment by
directing attention and mobilizing effort toward attaining the
goal. Thus, the question of whether it is better to maximize
than to minimize one’s goals (asked by Gould, 1939) cannot
adequately be answered without examining the effects of situational and personality variables associated with goal choice
behavior. “Obviously, higher risk strategies sometimes lead to
worse performance outcomes than lower risk ones and the conditions under which better or worse outcomes occur need to be
studied further” (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 713).
Further examination of the goal attainment results shows that
HSEs did not achieve their goals in the following conditions:
(a) self-set hard goal instruction/piece-rate plans, which has
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already been discussed; (b) self-set hard goal instruction/hourly
plans; and (c) self-set easy goal instruction/GA-bonus plans.
Similarly, LSEs did not achieve their goals under the self-set
hard goal/GA-bonus condition. It is clear that personal goal
level may contribute to a lack of goal attainment in the preceding conditions (the correlation is very high between goal
attainment and personal goals; see Table 1). Latham and Locke
(1991, p. 214) point out that “the higher the absolute level of
the goal the more difficult it is for a person to achieve it.” A
lingering question that needs to be answered is, why do HSEs
set high goals under the GA-bonus/easy goal instruction and
LSEs set high goals under the GA-bonus/hard goal instruction,
although setting high goals under these conditions is against
HSEs’ and LSEs’ self-interest (i.e., hurting them financially by
not attaining those goals and losing the bonus)?
In addition, under every monetary incentive type (i.e.,
piece-rate, hourly, and GA-bonus plans), the self-set any goal
instruction condition produced positive goal attainment score
regardless of goal level and self-esteem. This goal attainment
result is inconsistent with Mowen et al. (1981) and Lee et al.
(1997), who found that in the assigned moderate and easy
goal conditions, participants performed better under the GAbonus plans than under the piece-rate plans. The “self-set any
goal instruction” may have increased participants’ control over
goal choice, thereby increasing self-determination, which contributed to high intrinsic motivation and high goal attainment.
This is consistent with the achievement motivation theory by
Atkinson (1958), which argues that the highest level of achievement should occur at a moderate level of difficulty (such as
the case in the any goal instruction) where the probability of
achievement is 50/50.
The conclusion from the present research is that person–
situation interaction is promising in understanding the effects
on personal goals and goal attainment, as explained in the preceding material. Although some hypotheses are not supported
and some are partially supported, the general finding of the
present research indicates that a combination of self-set hard
goal instruction, pay for performance, and high self-esteem produced better personal goals, performance, and goal attainment
than their individual contributions. Such a conclusion is important since there has been little interest in exploring the role of
personality in goal setting, given that goal directs behavior, thus
leaving little room for personality-based explanations (Seijts,
Latham, Tasa, & Latham, 2004). After all, personality variables still account for a small amount of variance in personal
goals and performance (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, &
Vohs, 2003; Kalnbach & Hinsz, 1999), and the interaction
between personality and situational variables in influencing personal goals and subsequent behavior has been an unpopular
topic in the goal-setting literature (presumably because of the
confusion over the role of personality in goal setting and the
complexity of interaction research). While the last two decades
have seen substantial advances in the field of personality and
motivation, “several researchers have expressed concern about
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the incompleteness and inadequacy of extant formulations, particularly with respect to person–situation interaction” (Kanfer &
Heggestad, 1997, p. 6). The present research, therefore, sheds
light on this problem and shows that personality when studied
interactively with the right variables can influence behavior.
Future research should also focus on (a) person–situation
interaction when examining determinants of personal goals and
goal attainment, and identify the conditions under which the
maximization of one’s goals can be counterproductive; and
(b) the psychological process associated with personal goals
such as self-enhancement versus self-protection, the positive
and negative consequences of goal attainment under different
incentive types, and the impact of goal attainment on subsequent
performance.
The preceding findings are new, and have significant theoretical implications for theory and research. While Korman’s
self-consistency theory indicates that HSEs will behave effectively across situations consistent with their self-image, the
present research argues that this may not be necessarily the
case since HSEs may backfire and fail even under the most
favorable conditions (i.e., pay for performance and self-set hard
goal instruction). Accordingly, incorporating person–situation
interaction into the theory may have considerable potential.
Researchers should investigate conditions under which HSEs
would be more responsive to the effects of monetary incentives.
The Mediating Effects of Personal Goals, Self-Efficacy,
and Goal Commitment on the Independent
Variables–Performance Relationship
The main effects of goal instructions and incentive types
were significant in influencing performance. The performance
results are consistent with the Mowen et al. (1981) and Lee et al.
(1997) results such that, in general, piece-rate participants had
the highest performance under the self-set hard goal instruction,
whereas GA-bonus participants had the highest performance
under the self-set any goal instruction. A similar pattern of
results was also obtained by HSEs regarding personal goals.
Regarding the process by which the described interaction
(among goal instruction, incentive types, and self-esteem) influences performance, the present research shows that personal
goals completely mediate the effects of self-set goal level
instructions on performance. This finding supports Locke and
Latham (1990), who argue that instructions do not automatically influence an individual’s behavior except when they are
transformed into goals and the individual is willing to act upon
those goals. However, the mediating effects of self-efficacy
and goal commitment were not supported. The lack of support for self-efficacy is not consistent with Lee et al. (1997),
who found that self-efficacy mediated the interactive effects of
incentive types and assigned goal difficulty on performance.
This difference in results can be attributed to goal origins (Lee
et al. used assigned goals, whereas the present research used
self-set goal level instruction). However, self-efficacy correlated
significantly with self-esteem, personal goals, and performance

even after controlling for the practice trial performance (see
Table 1). The significant main effect of self-esteem on both
goal commitment and self-efficacy is consistent with the present
research arguments. HSEs have higher goal commitment and
higher self-efficacy in almost all the experimental conditions
than LSEs. Such findings support Gardner and Pierce’s (1998)
and Hollenbeck and Klein’s (1987) arguments that self-esteem
should positively influence self-efficacy and goal commitment,
respectively. In addition, the finding that goal commitment is
significantly higher under both the piece-rate and GA-bonus
plans than under hourly plans supports Locke and Latham
(1990), who argue that monetary incentives should increase goal
commitment.
Limitations and Practical Implications
Although “laboratory findings regarding goal setting generalize very well to field setting” (Latham & Locke, 1991, p. 216),
caution should be exercised when making recommendations
to managers due to some limitations of the present research,
such as the use of student volunteers and the time duration of
the experiment. Further, not all the research hypotheses were
fully supported, and such a lack of support could partially
be due to the small sample size of HSEs and LSEs in each
experimental cell.
The present research has several practical implications for
managers regarding selection, participation in decision making, performance evaluation, design of an incentive system, and
training.
The present research showed that HSEs as opposed to LSEs
behaved more rationally and that their behavior was more consistent with the research arguments than was found with LSEs.
Organizations and their managers are increasingly in need of
individuals with high self-esteem, especially during times of
high uncertainty and high competition. To select HSEs, managers may use the “situation interview” developed by Latham,
Saari, Pursell, and Campion (1980). The situation interview is
used to evaluate an applicant’s credentials, prior to employment,
by providing a series of questions, each of which contains a
dilemma, that assesses an applicant’s goals for what he/she
would do if he/she is faced with such a dilemma. A situation interview can help in the assessment of an individual’s
self-esteem because those with high self-worth will choose to
persist in the face of hardship and will choose harder goals as
the environment becomes tougher.
Although HSEs are predisposed to behave effectively, managers should not rely on the personality characteristics of HSEs
as the sole determinants of behavior since the present research
shows that self-esteem responsiveness to the effects of monetary incentives is a function of the combination of monetary
incentive types and self-set goal level instructions. Therefore,
managers should instruct HSEs to set hard goals for themselves
and apply pay for performance (such as the piece-rate system). Self-set hard goal instruction enhances the competency,
motivational, and regulatory functions of pay for performance,
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and therefore the combination of self-set hard goal instruction
and pay for performance provides a high target to shoot for
that motivates an individual to regulate his/her action toward
the achievement of that target and, at the same time, to direct
his/her effort toward the fulfillment of organizational goals.
Locke and Latham (1990) point out that “non-commitment to
organizational goals is a well-known phenomenon. It usually
manifests itself to restriction of output” (p. 124).
Managers, however, should be cautious when combining the
piece-rate system with self-set hard goal instruction because
such a combination causes individuals to overestimate their
goals and underachieve them, especially for HSEs. To prevent individuals from choosing risky goals and engaging in
risky strategies that sometimes hurt the organization, managers
should communicate to employees the organizational vision
in order to align the goals of the individual with that of the
organization (see Locke & Latham, 2002). In this regard, the
employees’ personal goals can be decided upon participatively
with managers, where both managers and employees engage
in negotiation to arrive at the goal level that both agree upon.
Consequently, participatively set goals can serve as the basis for
performance appraisal. Performance that exceeds, or falls short
of, the negotiated goals can have a positive or negative impact,
respectively, on employees’ performance evaluations.
In addition, employees’ attainment of their personal goals
can help managers in achieving organizational goals. Research
findings have shown a significant correlation between goal setting and organizational profitability (Locke & Latham, 2002).
Accordingly, managers should contribute to employees’ goal
attainment by facilitating conditions that support, and by suppressing situations that hinder, the attainment of those goals.
The result of the present study suggests that there is a great
need for managers to understand the determinants of personal
goals.
How to motivate employees and how to reward them are
always some of the major concerns for managers. The present
research offers some suggestions for managers for the design
of an incentive system. Managers should instruct HSEs to set
hard goals under the piece-rate system since, according to
Figure 3, HSEs set the highest level of personal goals under
the hard goal instruction/piece-rate condition. However, managers should instruct HSEs to set moderate goals under the
GA-bonus system, since HSEs set the highest level of personal goals under the GA-bonus/any goal instruction condition
(see Figure 3). These moderate goals, however, should be set
above average performance to prevent those goals from becoming easy to achieve over time (see Lee et al., 1997). Managers
should prevent employees from setting low goals by determining a minimum performance goal for employees below which
performance will not be acceptable (see Locke, 2004).
Although assigned hard goals and self-set hard goal instruction are effective external mechanisms designed to increase
motivation (assuming that goal level is the same under both),
instructing employees to set hard goals for themselves may
be more effective then assigning hard goals to them because
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self-set goals, as compared to assigned goals, imply volition
(Hollenbeck & Kelin, 1987) and they are a very important part
of the employees’ self-management and self-regulation, due to
the fact that conscious human activities and actions are regulated by the individual’s goals (Latham & Locke, 1991). “Given
adequate ability and commitment to the goal, the harder the goal
the higher the performance” (Latham & Locke, 1991, p. 214).
The result of this research shows that personal goals mediate the
self-set goal level instruction–performance relationship. Unless
an individual sets a difficult goal in response to self-set hard goal
instruction, goal instruction would not be effective. Managers
should make sure that employees understand self-set hard goal
instruction and that they are able and willing to act upon such
instruction by setting hard goals and achieving high performance. In addition, managers should train people in effective
self-regulation (Latham & Locke, 1991). “Training in self management teaches people to assess their problems, to set specific
hard goals in relation to those problems, to self-monitor . . . ,
and to identify and administer rewards for working toward and
penalties for failing to work toward goal attainment” (Latham &
Locke, 1991, pp. 234–235).
Although self-efficacy does not mediate the interactive
effects of the independent variables (self-esteem, goal instructions, and incentive types) on performance, it does correlate
with the dependent variables even after controlling for the
practice trial performance. An organization should enhance
self-efficacy at work by providing training that helps employees gain task mastery. An organization should also expose
employees to effective role modeling and enhance communication that expresses confidence in its employees’ ability to
achieve the organizational goals (Locke & Latham, 2002), such
as instructing employees to set hard goals.
In conclusion, human behavior is complex and can only be
understood by studying the person–situation interaction. This
research sheds light on the determinants of goal choice and
goal attainment and shows that person–situation interaction
is the most promising in advancing our understanding of an
individual’s personal goals through providing a concise and
complete picture of the factors that influence such a complex
and important construct. Such a focus will eventually generate
new research that brings on an integrative link among different personality and situational variables that influence personal
goals and their consequences.
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